Abstract-Current techniques in sequencing a genome allow a service provider (e.g. a sequencing company) to have full access to the genome information, and thus the privacy of individuals regarding their lifetime secret is violated. In this paper, we introduce the problem of private DNA sequencing, where the goal is to keep the DNA sequence private to the sequencer. We propose an architecture, where the task of reading fragments of DNA and the task of DNA assembly are separated, the former is done at the sequencer(s), and the later is completed at a local trusted data collector. To satisfy the privacy constraint at the sequencer and reconstruction condition at the data collector, we create an information gap between these two relying on two techniques: (i) we use more than one non-colluding sequencer, all reporting the read fragments to the single data collector, (ii) adding the fragments of some known DNA molecules, which are still unknown to the sequencers, to the pool. We prove that these two techniques provide enough freedom to satisfy both conditions at the same time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The human genome is a long string comprised of roughly 3 billion units called nucleotides. Each nucleotide is chosen from a set of four possible types {A, C, G, T }. Human genomes are more than 98 percents alike. Variations within a human population can be divided into common variants and rare variants. Most of the differences among individuals' genomes can be captured by the common variants known as Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). An individual's genome can be identified uniquely by these SNPs. The process of identifying the SNPs of an individual is called genotyping.
Having access to the genome of an individual reveals critical information regarding their phenotype [1] . It can be used to predict the risk of a particular disease and to propose personal medical care. As a result, the rate of genetic testing services has risen dramatically in recent years [2] . On the other hand, this information can be abused, for example by insurance companies to increase the rates for individuals. Therefore, keeping the confidentiality of this information is a major concern [3] . Adding to the concern, we should note that disclosure of this information can also put one's relatives at risk due to inherited similarities [4] . Privacy issues in genomics have been the focus of many research initiatives [5] , [6] , mainly investigating anonymization techniques in a DNA data set [7] , [8] . However, leaking DNA information in the process of sequencing has been completely overlooked.
In this paper, we aim to propose and analyze some technique with provable guarantees in keeping the genomic information private. In the proposed scheme, we still use existing sequencing machines for sequencing, however we prevent these machines from assembling the genomes. We note that the process of sequencing consists of two phases: (1) reading, i.e. identifying the sequence of genomes in each fragment of DNA. (2) processing, i.e. concatenation of the read fragments of DNA and assembling the entire sequence. The proposed solution in this paper is based on separating these two steps as follows. The reading step which is technological and expensive is outsourced, and the processing step which is computational is done locally, in-house, on trusted machines. We increase the ambiguity at the reading machines such that the processing step is impossible to be executed there. To increase the ambiguity, in a pooled sequencing framework, we add the fragments of some individuals with known DNA sequences to the pool. On top of that, we distribute the reading task among several sequencers and collect all the results to complete the processing task at a local processor, referred to as data collector. This will increase the knowledge gap between the data collector and each sequencer and allows us to complete the processing step at the data collector while limiting the information leakage at each sequencer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem setting is provided in Section II. In Section III, an achievable scheme is introduced. In Sections IV and V, the mathematical modelings underlying the scheme are introduced and the results are provided.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We propose a system architecture that includes a trusted data collector and a set of S non-colluding sequencers, for some S ∈ N. In addition, there is a set of M ∈ N individuals, labeled as individual 1 to individual M , who are interested to know their genome sequences, without leaking their DNA information to any of the sequencers. The data collector gathers the genomes of these individuals and sends the fragments of a particular subset of these individuals to each sequencer. Each sequencer s ∈ [S] reads these fragments (reading phase), and sends the resulting reads to the data collector. Then the data collector uses all the reads received from all sequencers and assembles the DNA sequences for each individual (processing phase). One should note here that, unlike conventional approaches, in the scenario proposed in this paper, we separate the reading phase, done in the sequencers, and the processing phase, completed in the trusted in-house data collector, in order to provide DNA privacy. Indeed, our objective is to design the parameters of the system such that the sequencers collectively can provide enough reads for the data collector to be able to assemble the DNA sequences, while each sequencer alone does not have enough information to reconstruct some parts of the sequences.
It is also assumed that there is a set of K ∈ N individuals, that the data collector knows their sequences a-priori, while the sequencers have no information about their sequences. In the proposed scenario, the DNA sequences of these individuals are used to increase the ambiguity, even more, at the sequencers, as compared to the data collector and improve privacy, as follows. The data collector adds the DNA fragments of these K individuals to the set of fragments that it sends to each sequencer. We call these K individuals with known DNA sequences as known individuals, and those M individuals with unknown DNA sequences as unknown individuals.
The genome of each individual can be characterized by genotyping their SNPs. Note that in every SNP position, two out of four types of bases (or alleles) can occur. The set of the two possible bases occurring in every SNP position is a public information. In every SNP position, the base occurring with more frequency is called major allele and the other one is called minor allele. In haploid individuals, in which there is one copy of the genome, this is equivalent to encoding the genome by a sequence of 1s and −1s that indicate major and minor alleles respectively. Thus, the DNA sequence (or equivalently SNP sequence) can be represented by a vector in {−1, 1} N , where N ∈ N denotes the total number of SNPs in the desired region of sequencing. We define the matrix The data collector sends a set of fragments
denote the set of fragments containing SNP position n for unknown individual m and known individual k, respectively. We define random variables α
k,n | as the coverage depth for SNPs X m,n and Y k,n , respectively, at sequencer s. As will be seen later on, as the coverage depth increases, there will be more resistance to the error produced by sequencers in the reading process. Every sequencer then reads the received fragments, with error, and reports these reads to the data collector. The set of reads reported to the data collector by the sequencer s is denoted by R (s) . Sequencers have errors in reading bases. The probability of error in reading a SNP in a fragment is assumed to be constant across all sequences and for all SNPs and is denoted by η ∈ (0, 1). More precisely, in a sequencer, for a fragment of an individual, and in a SNP, the probability that a 1 is read −1 or vice versa is η, independent of the sequencer, the individual, the fragment, and the SNP.
Having Y as a side-information, the data collector maps
whereX refers to an estimate of the matrix of SNPs for unknown individuals (X).
The scenario should be such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Reconstruction Condition: Let x n andx n denote the column n of the matrix X andX respectively. The reconstruction condition requires that the inequality below to hold for any given ϵ ∈ (0, 1):
ϵ is referred to as the accuracy level and is a design parameter.
indicate the set of all unknown individuals who have fragments sent to sequencer s ∈ [S] by the data collector. For privacy to be held, for any sequencer s ∈ [S], we want the distribution of X m,n , m ∈ A (s) , n ∈ [N ] remains almost the same before and after reading the fragments. To be precise, the privacy condition requires that the following inequality to hold for any given β ∈ (0, 1):
β is referred to as the privacy level and is a design parameter.
In the next section, we will introduce a proposed scheme that satisfies the two conditions simultaneously.
III. ALL-BUT-ONE ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
In this section, we propose a particular solution that allows us to satisfy both the reconstruction (1) and privacy (2) conditions. We have two assumptions in our scheme:
• Assumption 1: Every fragment is short enough to contain no more than one SNP.
• Assumption 2: Every fragment is long enough that can be correctly mapped to the reference genome, i.e. we can identify exactly from what region of the genome's sequence it came from.
In the proposed achievable scheme, we focus on the case where S = M . In cases where M is greater than S, we partition the set of individuals into groups of size S and use this scheme for each group separately. We index unknown individuals from 1 to M (M should be equal to or greater than 2 is this scheme) and similarly known individuals from 1 to K. In this paper, we propose a specific assignment scheme, to send the fragments of the individuals to the sequencers. In the proposed solution, named all-but-one scheme, the data collector sends the fragments of all individuals, except individual s, to the sequencer s. More precisely, for ∀s ∈ [S] and
This means that for ∀s ∈ [S] and ∀n ∈ [N ], α
k,n is rather complicated. To make the analysis tractable, first, in Section IV, we solve the problem for the case where these variables are constant and the same, and later in Section V, we generalize the results to the case where these variables are random.
IV. ALL-BUT-ONE SCHEME WITH CONSTANT COVERAGE DEPTH In this section for all ∀n
First, we introduce the main results. Then we derive the mathematical models, and finallay we prove the main results.
Theorem 1.
In the all-but-one scheme with the constant coverage depth of α and reading probability of error of η, the reconstruction condition (1) is satisfied if
.
Theorem 2.
In the all-but-one scheme with constant coverage depth, the privacy constraint (2) is satisfied if 
T . In the following, we will argue that in the all-but-one scenario, the knowledge provided by the sequencers to the data collector in SNP position n, can be modeled by a set of noisy linear equations as
where H = 1 M ×M −I M ×M , and g n and z n are M ×1 vectors and z n ∼ N (0, σ 2 I) in which
Consider Sequencer 1. Fragments of unknown individuals indexed 2 to M are sent to it, as well as fragments of all known individuals. These fragments are pooled and have no tags regarding the index of individuals. So the information that the data collector receives in every SNP position, is the number of fragments containing major (or minor) alleles. Thus, in SNP position n ∈ [N ], it receives the following sum
whereX (1) m,n,i andỸ (1) k,n,i are the noisy versions of X m,n and Y k,n after the reading phase in which there is an η probability of error in reading each fragment. Also i refers to the index of fragments. As mentioned before, the data collector knows the sequence of known individuals a-priori. For known individual k ∈ [K] and SNP position n ∈ [N ], we indicate the known alleles by y k,n ∈ {−1, 1}. Consequently for ∀i ∈ [α] we havẽ
After scaling (7), and subtracting ∑ K k=1 y k,n , the data collector calculates G (1) n , defined as G
In what follows, we write the mean and variance ofX
in which the last equality results from X 2 m,n = 1. Then using the MMSE estimate and orthogonality principle, we can writẽ
where Z (1) m,n,i is a random variable with E
and Var
m,n,i and X m,n are uncorrelated. Consequently
Based on central limit theorem
converges in distribution to a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 4η(1 − η). Thus
converges in distribution to a normal distribution with zero mean and variance
We have the same calculations forỸ (1) k,n,i , except that the data collector knows the actual values for Y k,n s. Consequently, we can see that (5) holds for
. See [9] for more details.
B. Mathematical Model in the Sequencers in the All-But-One Scheme
This part has a similar procedure as the previous section except that the sequencers have no prior knowledge of actual values for Y k,n s. For the sequencer 1,Ỹ (1) k,n,i for ∀i ∈ [α] can be written asỸ
Following the same steps as in the previous subsection, we can argue that Sequencer 1 receives q (1) n described as
and σ 2 is determined in (6).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Based on minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimation, x n is estimated byx n .
On the other hand, using union bound, we have
To upper bound the terms in the sum, we need to find the minimum distance between the values of Hx n over the possible values for x n which has the value 1 based on Lemma 3 in [9] . Using this and (5) and MMSE estimation, upper bounding the terms in the above sum is straightforward. Consequently
Putting the right-hand side less than ϵ, the theorem follows. For more details refer to [9] .
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: For each sequencer s,
The reason is that fragments contain just one SNP and are grouped based on their containing SNP position and in the group containing SNP position n, the information is stored in q 
. Thus, for privacy condition (2) to be satisfied, since
Without loss of generality, we have assumed that s = 1. Let
Based on (15), we have the Markov chain
n . Due to the data processing inequality we have
E. Discussion
Remark 1: For large values of K, based on the central limit theorem, we can use the normal distribution to approximate the entropies in (4), and derive
Thus (4) can be written as
, which leads to K ≥ log e 2β for β ≪ 1. Note that using (4) or its approximation, together with the Theorem 1, it is easy to see that we can always choose K and α such that both conditions are satisfied. First, we choose K such that (4) is satisfied, then based on that K, we use Theorem 1 to achieve α. For instance, for the case of M = 10, ϵ = β = η = 0.01, using the just mentioned inequality, we choose K ∼ = 22 and α ∼ = 30. , so it is better to choose c as large as possible. The maximum value for c is M . The problem for c = M is that it makes the reconstruction impossible because in this case, all entries in H are 1 and it is not invertible. This justifies the choice of c = M − 1 which makes not only H invertible but also helps to satisfy (4) to its maximum extent.
V. ALL-BUT-ONE SCHEME WITH RANDOM COVERAGE DEPTH
In this section, we solve the problem in the case of α (s) m,n s andα (s) k,n s to be random variables which is a more general and practical case. We assume that these variables are binomial random variables and approximate them with a normal distribution. Therefore, for ∀n
. As the coverage depths are countable variables and mostly have large values, we assumed thatᾱ ∈ N. Following the all-butone scheme, for ∀n ∈ [N ], ∀s ∈ [S], we have α (s) s,n = 0. Again, we first introduce our results. After that, the mathematical model and estimation rule are derived.
Theorem

3.
In the all-but-one scheme,
Remark 3: For the privacy condition, Theorem 2 is valid here as well. Please refer to [9] .
A. Mathematical Model in Data Collector in the All-But-One Scheme
For any SNP position n ∈ [N ], the objective for the data collector is to estimate the vector
T . We define the extended vector
T , where the last K entries are known to the data collector. Therefore, for the data collector, estimatingx n is equivalent to estimating x n . In the following, we will argue that the knowledge provided by the sequencers to the data collector in SNP position n, can be modeled by a set of noisy linear equations as follows
where g n and z n are M × 1 vectors, z n ∼ N (0, σ 2 I), and
where
and the rest of entries are 1.
Consider sequencer 1. As mentioned before, fragments of unknown individuals 2 to M is sent to sequencer 1. In pooled sequencing scenario, sequencer 1 will observe G (1) n , which is defined as
m,n,i . The rest is followed by a similar procedure as in the Section IV-A. Consequently (21) holds.
B. Estimation Rule
In this section, our objective is to find the rule that should be used by the data collector to estimatex n . Using the ML rule, the estimatex n is obtained bŷ x n = arg max xn P(g n |x n ) = arg max xn P(g n − Hx n |x n ) = arg max xn P(∆x n + z n = g n − Hx n |x n ),
where the last equality is due to (21) and (22). We should now derive the distribution of ∆x n + z n conditioned oñ x n . To do so, we should derive the equations for E(∆x n + z n |x n ) and Var(∆x n + z n |x n ). Then using the fact that ∆x n + z n conditioned onx n has a normal distribution, we have reached our objective. Proceeding all this, we will have ∆x n + z n conditioned onx n has N (0,σ 2 I) distribution, whereσ 2 ≜ (M + K − 1)σ 2 1 + σ 2 . Thus from (23) we havễ x n = arg minx n ||g n − Hx n ||. We reached the MMSE rule. For more details refer to [9] .
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: For the estimatex n based on MMSE we have P(error) = P(x n ̸ =x n ) = ∑ u P(x n = u)P(x n ̸ = u |x n = u).
Using union bound we have P(x n ̸ = u |x n = u) ≤ 
where σ , and that the minimum magnitude for H(u − v) is 2 with a similar reasoning as in Lemma 3 in [9] . Then, we can show that (see [9] .
Putting both terms in the right-hand side of the inequality above to be less than ϵ 2 , the theorem results. For more details refer to [9] .
